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Malcolm Feeley's marvelous Tappan lecture
includes several important features that students of
criminal justice and criminology have come to
associate with Feeley's scholarly trademark. First, the
breadth of Feeley's scholarly interests is breathtaking,
in terms of disciplinary variation (here, history,
criminal justice, public policy, and economics),
historical span (here, from the 17th century to the 21st)
and geographical reach (here, an examination of the
United States, Britain, and Australia.) Second,
Feeley's work is characterized by creative
comparativism. His unbridled curiosity about
everything under the sun leads him to ask broad
questions: How did different punishments supplant or
supplement other punishments? Why did a given
policy succeed in one place and fail miserably in
another? What can we learn from a phenomenon that
occurred in a particular place and time about a
phenomenon occurring in a completely different
setting? These questions lead him to pair seemingly
unrelated developments and see the commonalities
between them in ways that are instructive and helpful.
And third, Feeley's characteristic openmindedness
leads him to profound thinking, and to counterintuitive
conclusions, about things that have come to be
regarded as received wisdom in the field.
The comparison Feeley draws here between
convict transports and electronic monitoring is
reminiscent of a classic of criminal justice history:
John Langbein's comparison of torture and plea-
bargaining (1978). Rejecting the understandable
tendency to regard medieval torture as barbaric, and in
general, medieval justice as primitive and illogical,
Langbein shows us that both methods were designed
specifically to address serious problems in criminal
procedure. Torture was a response to strict rules of
evidence that required robust eyewitness testimony in
the absence of a confession and was supposed to
simplify the process to obtain the confession. Plea-
bargaining was a response to the rising costs of
criminal litigation and the complexities of jury trials
and was supposed to supplant trials in cases of guilty
pleas. Both methods-torture and plea bargains-
created "fast track" alternatives to slow, unworkable
official paths to the determination of guilt, and both
had eerily similar unintended consequences: in
particular, the risk of convicting innocent people.
Feeley's lecture provides a similar
counterintuitive comparison. Transportation and
electronic monitoring emerged as public-private
partnerships and created dramatic change in the
criminal justice system by increasing punishment
options. But, as Feeley argues, rather than decreasing
reliance on options conventionally regarded as more
barbaric-corporal punishment and incarceration-
they ended up expanding punitive options and acting
as an addition, rather than a substitution, to the
punishment menu.
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The comparison is apt in many ways, perhaps
even farther than Feeley takes it: Feeley highlights the
perennial involvement of private entrepreneurship in
the punishment field, countering the narrative that
privatization, in and of itself, is a major contributor to
the correctional crisis in the 20th and 21st centuries.
Focusing on private prison companies as the source of
mass incarceration and its evils is a common
progressive trope (Critical Resistance, 2014;
Schlosser, 1998). The Israeli Supreme Court earned
international praise for ruling against the
establishment of private prisons (Dorfman & Harel,
2013; HCJ 2605/05). Bernie Sanders has been lauded
by his supporters for making the eradication of private
prisons a lynchpin of his campaign (Lerner, 2015).
And, recently, the Obama Administration announced
that the federal government would no longer rely on
private prisons (Sullivan, 2016.) A recent report by the
Committee on Causes and Consequences of High
Rates of Incarceration (Travis & Western, 2014)
highlights privatization as one of the forces that
contributed to mass incarceration. But several
scholars-including Feeley himself--have argued that
the focus on privatization has missed the mark
(Aviram, 2015b; Dolovich, 2005; Feeley, 2014; Pfaff,
2014; Shamir, 2014).
First, the share of private corporations in the
overall incarceration project is extremely small; only
6% of U.S. inmates are incarcerated in private prisons
(Pfaff, 2014.) This is even truer with respect to the
federal government, which houses a minority of U.S.
inmates as it is, most of them in public prisons (Speri,
2016). Second, though private prison companies lobby
for more incarceration, their lobbying efforts are not
significant enough to be a dominant cause of
incarceration (Pfaff, 2014); if anything, their effect is
more noticeable detention of undocumented
immigrants, the new market these companies explore
as the market for domestic incarceration shrinks
(Aviram, 2015a). Third, as Shamir (2014) argues, the
nature of public-private partnerships makes the
distinction between public and private prisons
unhelpful and fairly naive: Even public prisons
privatize a large share of their everyday functions,
such as food, transportation, security, and health care.
Fourth, as Dolovich (2005) and Aviram (2015) have
argued, private prison companies have not cornered
the market on providing unconstitutional and
inadequate prison care and conditions, and the
scandals from the last few years in the California
prison system, which consists solely of public state
prisons, is a case in point. Privatization may be a
loathsome aspect of mass incarceration, but it is not its
driving force; the lion's share of the blame for mass
incarceration falls squarely upon the shoulders of
federal and state governments.
Moreover, as Feeley's comparison reminds us,
where privatization of punishment is concerned, it
takes two to tango. Just as the evils of mass
incarceration do not stem predominantly, or even
markedly, from privatization, its benefits line public
pockets as well as private ones. The transporters of the
1700s, the chain gang private owners of the late 1800s,
and the private juvenile facilities operators of the
2000s, are motivated by profit, but so are the
government officials who have sent them there-such
as the Philadelphia judges who sold juvenile offenders
to a private entrepreneur for kickbacks (Ecenbarger,
2012.)
Another important point is that the costs of
employing punishment methods at any era-both the
ones Feeley highlights and the ones they purported to
replace-are frequently rolled onto the people
subjected to these methods. Transportation may have
been profitable for the entrepreneurs, but any savings
in the conditions of transportation would come at the
expense of the transported convicts. Similarly, the
costs of electronic monitoring are, of course,
considerably lower than those of incarceration, but
people who wear the monitors are often expected to
shoulder the costs of their release. Recently, the
ACLU of Michigan brought a lawsuit regarding ankle
monitors, whose technical limitations require that
parolees spend hours near a plug to recharge them,
avoid washing their leg, and sometimes suffer painful
injuries associated with wearing the heavy device
(Carmody, 2015.) The Michigan Supreme Court
ordered a study of the monitors and their use (Wolf,
2015). The issue of costs also brings up questions of
stratification: Some penal innovations are available to
inmates who can foot the bill for their expenses, such
as "pay-to-stay" jail schemes (Buchanan, 2007;
Weisberg, 2007), and it would be interesting to closely
examine whether entrepreneurial innovations like
transportation and electronic monitoring cater to
particular individuals.
However, Feeley's analogy leaves some issues
unclear. Feeley relies on Rubin's data to show that
transportation did not bring an end to executions;
rather, those had tapered off before the beginning of
transportation, which supplanted other penal
outcomes, such as the more benign Benefit of Clergy.
But his account provides little explanation for the
original intent behind transportation. Electronic
monitoring developed deliberately as a substitute for
incarceration-pioneered by a judge who wanted to
use it for that particular purpose-and ended up
supplementing it. By contrast, even according to
Rubin's account (2012), which argues that the
architect of transportation was intended to supplant
executions, Feeley shows that at that point,
transportation had already been operating informally
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for decades and that the rates of executions had already
declined.
This is an important point, because Feeley's
analogy, like Langbein's, highlight the unintended
consequences of well-meant reforms. The lessons for
today's criminal justice reformers are obvious-to
avoid what Stanley Cohen (1985) referred to as
"widening the net" of social control. Today's core
incarcerated population in the United States-
approximately 2.2 million people (Sentencing Project,
2013)-is surrounded by a penumbra of people
subjected to penal control via parole and probation
(Pew, 2009). Thinking about transportation through
the same framework may teach us a grim lesson about
the arc of progress in criminal justice. To the extent
that transportation emerged as part of the "civilizing
process" identified by Norbert Elias (1939)-because
people in positions of power's taste for state-
perpetrated violence soured over time-the colonies
provided an easy, out-of-sight-out-of-mind solution.
But when we find new technologies and systems of
domination intended to supplant incarceration, and
end up supplementing it instead, the people we
supervise walk among us as second-class citizens,
while the original group whose suffering we hoped to
alleviate remains hidden from sight.
That this provocative comparison, spanning
centuries and continents, yields plenty of food for
thought on issues pertinent to cutting-edge criminal
justice reform is to Feeley's credit, and one more
testament to his scholarly stature and his very well-
deserved Tappan Award. May we all continue to learn
from him for many years to come.
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